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Abstract
We describe an application of Answer Set Programming to the understanding of narratives about
stereotypical activities, demonstrated via question answering. Substantial work in this direction
was done by Erik Mueller, who modeled stereotypical activities as scripts. His systems were able
to understand a good number of narratives, but could not process texts describing exceptional
scenarios. We propose addressing this problem by using a theory of intentions developed by
Blount, Gelfond, and Balduccini. We present a methodology in which we substitute scripts by
activities (i.e., hierarchical plans associated with goals) and employ the concept of an intentional
agent to reason about both normal and exceptional scenarios. We exemplify the application of
this methodology by answering questions about a number of restaurant stories. This paper is
under consideration for acceptance in TPLP.
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1 Introduction
This paper describes an application of Answer Set Programming to the understanding of
narratives. According to Schank and Abelson (1977), stories frequently narrate episodes
related to stereotypical activities — sequences of actions normally performed in a certain
order by one or more actors, according to cultural conventions. One example of a stereo-
typical activity is dining in a restaurant with table service, in which the following actions
are expected to occur: the customer enters, he is greeted by the waiter who leads him
to a table, the customer sits down, reads the menu, orders some dish, the waiter brings
the dish, the customer eats and then asks for the bill, the waiter places the bill on the
table, the customer pays and then leaves. A story mentioning a stereotypical activity is
not required to state explicitly all of the actions that are part of it, as it is assumed that
the reader is capable of filling in the blanks with his own commonsense knowledge about
the activity (Schank and Abelson 1977). Consider, for instance, the following narrative:
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Example 1 (Scenario 1, adapted from (Mueller 2007))
Nicole went to a vegetarian restaurant. She ordered lentil soup. The waitress set the soup
in the middle of the table. Nicole enjoyed the soup. She left the restaurant.
Norms indicate, for instance, that customers are expected to pay for their meal. Readers
are supposed to know such conventions, and so this information is missing from the text.
Schank and Abelson (1977) introduced the concept of a script to model stereotypi-
cal activities: a fixed sequence of actions that are always executed in a specific order.
Following these ideas, Mueller conducted substantial work on texts about stereotypical
activities: news about terrorist incidents (2004) and restaurant stories (2007). In the lat-
ter he developed a system that took as an input a restaurant story, processed it using
information extraction techniques, and used a commonsense knowledge base about the
restaurant domain to demonstrate an understanding of the narrative by answering ques-
tions whose answers were not necessarily stated in the text. The system performed well
but the rigidity of scripts did not allow for the correct processing of scenarios describing
exceptions (e.g., someone else paying for the customer’s meal). To be able to handle such
scenarios, all possible exceptions of a script would have to be foreseen and encoded as
new scripts by the designer of the knowledge base, which is an important hurdle.
In this paper, we propose a new representation methodology and reasoning approach,
which makes it possible to answer, in both normal and exception scenarios, questions
about events that did or did not take place. We overcome limitations in Mueller’s work
by abandoning the rigid script-based approach. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the
first scalable approach to the understanding of exceptional scenarios.
Instead, we propose to view characters in stories about stereotypical activities (e.g.,
the customer, waiter, and cook in a restaurant scenario), as BDI agents that intend to
perform some actions in order to achieve certain goals, but may not always need to/ be
able to perform these actions as soon as intended. It is instrumental for our purpose to
use a theory of intentions developed by Blount et al. (2015) that introduces the concept
of an activity — a sequence of agent actions and sub-activities that are supposed to
achieve a goal. The theory of intentions is written in an action language (AL) and is
translatable into Answer Set Prolog (ASP) (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991). It can be easily
coupled with ASP commonsense knowledge bases about actions and their effects, and
with reasoning algorithms encoded in ASP or its extensions, to build executable systems.
Other implementations of BDI agents exist. Some cannot be immediately integrated
in executable systems (Rao and Georgeff 1991); it remains to be seen whether others
(Bordini et al. 2007) may be more readily integrated in our methodology.
Blount et al. also introduced an architecture (AIA) of an intentional agent, an agent
that obeys his intentions. According to AIA, at each time step, the agent observes the
world, explains observations incompatible with its expectations (diagnosis), and deter-
mines what action to execute next (planning). The reasoning module implementing AIA
allows an agent to reason about a wide variety of scenarios, including the serendipitous
achievement of its goal by exogenous actions or the realization that an active activity has
no chance to achieve its goal anymore (i.e., it is futile), illustrated by the texts below.
Example 2 (Serendipity)
Nicole went to a vegetarian restaurant. She ordered lentil soup. When the waitress brought
3her the soup, she told her that it was on the house. Nicole enjoyed the soup and then left.
(The reader should understand that Nicole did not pay for the soup.)
Example 3 (Detecting Futile Activity)
Nicole went to a vegetarian restaurant. She sat down and wanted to order lentil soup,
but it was not on the menu. (The reader should deduce that Nicole stopped her plan of
eating lentil soup here.)
Example 4 (Diagnosis)
Nicole went to a vegetarian restaurant. She ordered lentil soup. The waitress brought her
a miso soup instead. (The reader is supposed to produce some explanations for what
may have gone wrong: either the waitress or the cook misunderstood the order.)
In contrast with AIA, which encodes an agent’s reasoning process about his own goals,
intentions, and ways to achieve them, we need to represent the reasoning process of a
(cautious) reader that learns about the actions of an intentional agent from a narrative.
For instance, while an intelligent agent creates or selects its own activity to achieve a
goal, in a narrative context, the reader learns about the activity that was selected by the
agent from the text. As a consequence, one of our goals in this work is to understand what
parts of the AIA architecture can be adapted to our purpose of modeling the reasoning of
a narrative reader and how. The main difficulty is that stereotypical activities normally
include several agents (e.g., customer, waiter, cook), not just one. We had to extend
Blount et al.’s theory to be able to track the intentions of several agents at a time.
Our methodology can be applied to narratives about other stereotypical activities. This
is just a first exploration of the subject,1 which can be further expanded by addressing, for
instance, script variations. We propose a prototypical implementation of the end-to-end
system in which understanding is tested via question answering. We convert questions to
logic forms to closely match their meanings in English and encode corresponding rules in
ASP to retrieve answers. Mueller’s collection of training and test excerpts is proprietary,
and creating a benchmark of exceptional scenarios is a laborious task. As a result, we
evaluate our work on a smaller collection of texts collected from the Internet.
In what follows, the paper provides a review of related and background work. It then
continues with the description of the methodology and a preliminary implementation,
and their exemplification on sample scenarios. It ends with conclusions and future work.
2 Related Work
Story Understanding. An extensive review of narrative processing systems can be
found in Mueller’s paper (2007). Newer systems exist, for example the logic-based systems
discussed by Michael (2013) or Diakidoy et al. (2015), but do not focus specifically on
stereotypical activities. The task we undertake here is a more difficult one because stories
about stereotypical activities tend to omit more information about the events taking place
compared to other texts, as such information is expected to be filled in by the reader.
Restaurant Narratives. Erik Mueller’s work is based on the hypothesis that readers of
1 An extended abstract on this work was previously published by Inclezan et al. (2017); in previous
work by Zhang and Inclezan (2017), only the customer was modeled as a goal-driven agent.
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a text understand it by constructing a mental model of the narrative. Mueller’s system
(2007) showed an understanding of restaurant narratives by answering questions about
time and space aspects that were not necessarily mentioned explicitly in the text. His
system relied on two important pieces of background knowledge: (1) a commonsense
knowledge base about actions occurring in a restaurant, their effects and preconditions,
encoded in Event Calculus (Shanahan 1997) and (2) a script describing a sequence of
actions performed by different characters in a normal unfolding of a restaurant episode.
The system processed English text using information extraction techniques in order to
fill out slot values in a template. In particular, it detected the last action from the
restaurant script that was mentioned in the text, and constructed a logic form in which
the occurrence of all actions in the script up to that last one mentioned was assumed
and recorded via facts. Clearly, this approach cannot be applied to exceptional cases. For
instance, the last script action identifiable in the scenario in Example 2 is that Nicole left
the restaurant. As a result, the reasoning problem constructed by Mueller’s system for this
excerpt would state as a fact that Nicole also executed a preceding action in the script,
that of paying for her meal, which would be incorrect. Mueller’s system was evaluated
on text excerpts retrieved from the web or Project Gutenberg collection. Scenarios with
exceptional cases were not processed correctly because of a lack of flexibility of scripts.
Activity Recognition. The task we undertake here presents some similarities to ac-
tivity recognition, in that it requires observing agents and their environment in order to
complete the picture about the agents’ actions and activities. However, unlike activity
recognition, understanding narratives limited to a single stereotypical activity (restau-
rant dining) does not require identifying agents’ goals, which are always the same for
each role in our case (e.g., the customer always wants to become satiated). Gabaldon
(2009) performed activity recognition using a simpler theory of intentions by Baral and
Gelfond (2005) that did not consider goal-driven agents. Nieves et al. (2013) proposed an
argumentation-based approach for activity recognition, applied to activities defined as
pairs of a motive and a set of goal-directed actions; in contrast, in Blount et al.’s work,
basic actions in an activity may, but are not required to, have an associated goal. A
few decades earlier, Ng and Mooney (1992) used abduction to create a plan recognition
system and tested it on a collection of short narratives that included restaurant dining.
However, their system cannot reason about serendipitous achievement of an agent’s goals
by someone else’s actions (Example 2), nor answer questions about an agent’s intentions.
3 Preliminary: Theory of Intentions
Blount et al. (Blount 2013; Blount et al. 2015) developed a theory about the intentions of
a goal-driven agent by substantially elaborating on previous work by Baral and Gelfond
(2005). In their theory, each sequence of actions (i.e., plan) of an agent was associated
with a goal that it was meant to achieve, and the combination of the two was called an ac-
tivity. Activities could have nested sub-activities, and were encoded using the predicates:
activity(m) (m is an activity); goal(m,g) (the goal of activity m is g); length(m,n)
(the length of activity m is n); and comp(m,k,x) (the kth component of activity m is
x, where x is either an action or a sub-activity).
5The authors introduced the concept of an intentional agent2 — one that has goals
that it intends to pursue, “only attempts to perform those actions that are intended and
does so without delay.” As normally done in our field, the agent is expected to possess
knowledge about the changing world around it. This can be represented as a transition
diagram in which nodes denote physical states of the world and arcs are labeled by
physically executable actions that may take the world from one state to the other. States
describe the values of relevant properties of the world, where properties are divided
into fluents (those that can be changed by actions) and statics (those that cannot). To
accommodate intentions and decisions of an intentional agent, Blount et al. expanded the
traditional transition diagram with mental fluents and actions. Three important mental
fluents in their theory are status(m,k) (m is in progress if k ≥ 0; not yet started
or stopped if k = −1), active goal(g) (“goal g is active”), and next action(m, a) (“the
next physical action to be executed as part of activitym is a”). Axioms describe how the
execution of physical actions affects the status of activities and sub-activities, activates
(or inactivates) goals and sub-goals, and determines the selection of the next action to
be executed (see (Blount 2013) for a complete list of axioms). Mental actions include
select(g) and abandon(g) for goals, and start(m) and stop(m) for activities. The new
transition diagram is encoded in action language AL; in what follows, we denote by T I
the ASP translation of the AL encoding.
Additionally, Blount et al. developed an agent architecture AIA for an intentional
agent, implemented in CR-Prolog (Balduccini and Gelfond 2003; Balduccini 2007) – an
extension of ASP. Blount (2013) adapted the agent loop proposed by Balduccini and
Gelfond (2008) and outlined the control loop that governs the behavior of an intentional
agent, which we reproduce in Figure 1.
Observe the world and initialize history with observations;
1. interpret observations;
2. find an intended action e;
3. attempt to perform e and
update history with a record of the attempt;
4. observe the world,
update history with observations, and
go to step 3.
Fig. 1. AIA control loop
For each step of the control loop, we provide a summary of the original description
(see pages 43-44 of (Blount 2013)). In step 1, the agent uses diagnostic reasoning to
explain unexpected observations, which involves determining which exogenous (i.e., non-
agent) actions may have occurred without being observed. From the point of view of our
2 There are similarities between Blount et al.’s intentional agents and BDI commitment agents
(Rao and Georgeff 1991; Wooldridge 2009). To the best of our knowledge, they have not yet been
studied precisely. However, a link can be drawn, at the intuitive level, as follows. If we consider the
perspective that ASP formalizations are typically focused on the beliefs of an agent about its envi-
ronment, an intentional agent can be viewed as an open-minded commitment agent. However, if the
ASP formalization reflects accurately the physical reality, then it can be viewed as a single-minded
commitment agent.
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approach, step 2 is arguably one of the most critical. The goal of this step is to allow the
agent to find an intended action. The following intended actions are considered:
• To continue executing an ongoing activity that is expected to achieve its goal;
• To stop an ongoing activity whose goal is no longer active (because it has been
either achieved, as in Example 2, or abandoned);
• To stop an activity that is no longer expected to achieve its goal (as in Example 3);
or
• To start a chosen activity that is expected to achieve its goal.
Under certain conditions, there may be no way for the agent to achieve its goal, or
the agent may simply have no goal. In either case, the agent’s intended action is to
wait. For the case when the agent continues executing an ongoing activity, the fluent
next action(m, a) in the theory of intentions becomes relevant as it indicates the action
in activity m that the agent would have to attempt next. In step 3, the agent acts
and records its attempt to perform the intended action. In the final step 4, the agent
observes the values of fluents, the result of his attempt to act from step 3, and possibly
the occurrence of some exogenous actions.
Restaurant stories require reasoning simultaneously about the intentions of multiple
goal-driven agents. To accommodate for this, we added an extra argument ag to as-
sociate an agent to each mental fluent and action of T I (e.g., status(m,k) became
status(ag,m,k)). We also extended T I by the ASP axioms below, needed to make ex-
plicit Blount et al.’s assumption that an agent has only one top-level goal at a time. This
restriction is important when modeling an external observer and was not fully captured
previously by T I. The first two axioms say that an agent cannot select a goal if it already
has an active goal or if it selects another goal at the same time. The third rule says that
the stopping of an activity inactivates the goals of all of its sub-activities.
impossible(select(Ag,G), I) ← holds(active goal(Ag,G1), I), possible goal(Ag,G).
impossible(select(Ag,G), I) ← occurs(select(Ag,G1), I), possible goal(Ag,G),
G 6= G1.
¬holds(active goal(Ag,G1), I + 1) ← goal(M1, G1),
holds(descendant(Ag,M1,M), I),
occurs(stop(Ag,M), I).
4 Methodology
In this section, we outline a methodology of using the theory of intentions and parts of
the AIA architecture to design a program that can show an understanding of stories
about stereotypical activities, exemplified on restaurant stories. We distinguish between
the story time line containing strictly the events mentioned in the text, and the reasoning
time line corresponding to the mental model that the reader constructs. We begin with
assumptions and the general methodology, on which we elaborate in the next subsections.
Assumptions. We assume that a wide coverage commonsense knowledge base (KB)
written in ASP is available to us and that it contains information about a large number
of actions, their effects and preconditions, including actions in the stereotypical activity.
How to actually build such a knowledge base is a difficult research question, but it is
orthogonal to our goal. To see the first necessary steps for building such a knowledge base
7see Diakidoy et al. (2015). In practice, in order to be able to evaluate our methodology, we
have built a basic knowledge base with core information about restaurants and, whenever
a scenario needed new information, we expanded the knowledge base with new actions
and fluents. We operated under the assumption that all this information would be in KB
from the beginning. To simplify this first attempt to use a theory of intentions to reason
about stereotypical activities, we assumed that there is only one customer that wants to
dine, only one waiter, one cook, and one ordered dish.
Methodology. According to our methodology, for each input text t and set of questions
Q, we construct a logic program Π(t, Q) (simply Π(t) if Q is empty). Its answer sets
represent models of the narrative and answers to questions in Q. This logic program has
two parts, one that is pre-defined, and another that depends on the input.
The pre-defined part consists of the following items:
1. The KB knowledge base, with a core describing sorts, fluents, actions, and some
pre-defined objects relevant to the stereotypical activity of focus;
2. The ASP theory of intentions, T I;
3. A module encoding stereotypical activities as T I activities for each character; and
4. A reasoning module, encoding (i) a mapping of time points on the story time line
into points on the reasoning time line; (ii) reasoning components adapted from the
AIA architecture to reflect a reader’s reasoning process and expected to allow rea-
soning about serendipitous achievement of goals, decisions to stop futile activities,
and diagnosis; and (iii) a question answering component.
The input-dependent part (i.e., the logic form obtained by translating the English
text t and questions in Q into ASP facts) consists of the following:
5. Facts defining objects mentioned in the text t as instances of relevant sorts in KB;
6. Observations about the values of fluents and the occurrences of actions at different
points on the story time line;
7. Default information about the values of fluents in the initial situation; and
8. Facts encoding each question in Q.
4.1 The Core of the Commonsense Knowledge Base KB
The core of KB defines knowledge related to the restaurant environment. It includes a
hierarchy of sorts with main sorts person, thing, restaurant, and location ; person has sub-
sorts customer , waiter , and cook ; and thing has sub-sorts food , menu, and bill . In this
paper, the following pre-defined instances of sorts are used: entrance, kt (kitchen), ct
(counter), outside, t (table) are instances of location ; m is amenu; and b is the customer’s
bill. The core describes actions and fluents related to the restaurant environment that
can be seen in Table 1, in which t denotes the table and we use c for a customer ; w for
a waiter ; ck for a cook ; f for a food ; r for a restaurant ; t1 and t2 for things; l, l1 and l2
for locations; p, p1, and p2 for persons. We denote the agent performing each action a
by using the static actor(a,p). Each action has a unique actor, except lead to(w, c, t) in
which both w and c (waiter and customer) are considered actors. All fluents are inertial
(i.e., they normally maintain their previous values unless changed by an action), except
the five on the last column that are defined-positive fluents, i.e., their positive value is
completely defined in terms of other fluents; otherwise their default value is false.
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Table 1. Important actions and fluents in the restaurant-related core of KB
A
c
ti
o
n
s go(c, r) sit(c) request (p1, t, p2) stand up(c)
greet(w, c) pick up(p, t, l) prepare(ck, f ) leave(c)
move(p, l1, l2) put down(p, t, l) eat(c, f) make unavailable(f , r)
lead to(w, c, t) order(c, f , w) pay(c) interference
F
lu
e
n
ts
hungry(c) standing by(p, l) available(f , r) order transmitted (c)
open(r) sitting(c) food prepared (ck, f) done with payment(c)
at loc(t, l) holding(p, t) served (c) satiated and out(c)
in(c, r) menu read(c) bill generated (c) served and billed(c)
welcomed(c) informed(p1, t, p2) paid(b) done with request (ck, w)
Axioms about the direct, indirect effects and preconditions of actions are encoded in
ASP using standard methods (Gelfond and Kahl 2014). We show here the encoding of a
direct effect of action eat(c, f) (the food is no longer on the table) and a condition that
renders its execution impossible (a customer cannot eat unless the food is on the table):
¬holds(at l(F, t), I + 1) ← occurs(eat(C,F ), I).
impossible(eat(C,F ), I) ← ¬holds(at l(F, t), I), customer(C).
Defined fluents like satiated and out are defined by rules like:
holds(satiated and out(C), I) ← holds(satiated(C), I), holds(at l(C, outside), I).
The knowledge base KB contains an exogenous action (i.e., a non-agent action) called
interference (see Table 1). The simultaneous occurrence of this action with order (c, f , w)
or request(p1, t, p2) causes miscommunication, meaning that the food order or general
request is not transmitted correctly. We encode this as a non-deterministic direct effect
in the rules:
holds(informed(W,F,C), I + 1) ← occurs(order(C,F,W ), I),
not ¬holds(informed(W,F,C), I).
1{holds(informed(W,F1, C), I + 1) : other food(F1, F )}1 ←
occurs(order(C,F,W ), I), occurs(interference, I).
other food(F1, F ) ← food(F ), food(F1), F 6= F1.
¬holds(informed(W,F1, C), I + 1) ← holds(informed(W,F2, C), I), F1 6= F2.
The first rule indicates that normally the waiter understands the customer’s order cor-
rectly. An exception is when an interference occurs at the same time as a customer’s
action of ordering some food F , which causes the waiter to understand that the customer
is asking for a different food than F (second axiom above). The fourth rule says that
informed is a functional fluent. The KB contains similar rules for the action representing
all other communication acts, request(p1, t, p2).
4.2 Encoding Stereotypical Activities
Stories about stereotypical activities include multiple characters with their own goals and
actions. We modeled these as T I activities stored in the KB, as shown in Table 2 (recall
that t, m, b, kt, and ct stand for the table, menu, bill, kitchen, and counter respectively).
For the customer, we defined an activity c act(C,R,W,F ) that should be read as
9Table 2. Activities (and sub-activities) for the main roles in a restaurant story
C
u
st
o
m
e
r
Name: c act(C,R,W, F )
Plan: [ go(C,R), lead to(W,C, t), sit(C), c subact 1(C,F,W ), eat(C,F ),
c subact 2(C,W ), stand up(C), move(C, t, entrance), leave(C) ]
Goal: satiated and out(C)
Name: c subact 1(C,F,W ) (sub-activity)
Plan: [ pick up(C,m, t), put down(C, m, t), order(C,F,W ) ]
Goal: order transmitted(C)
Name: c subact 2(C,W ) (sub-activity)
Plan: [ request(C,b,W ), pay(C,b) ]
Goal: done with payment(C)
W
a
it
e
r
Name: w act(W,C, F1, F2)
Plan: [ greet(W,C), lead to(W,C, t), move(W,t, kt), request(W,F1, ck),
pick up(W,F2, kt), move(W,kt, t), put down(W,F2, t), move(W,t, ct),
pick up(W,b, ct), move(W,ct, t), put down(W, b, t) ]
Goal: served and billed(C)
C
o
o
k Name: ck act(Ck, F,W )
Plan: [ prepare(Ck,F,W ) ]
Goal: done with request(Ck,W )
“customer C goes to restaurant R where he communicates to waiter W an order for
food F .” We found that modeling the customer’s activity as a nested one with sub-
activities allowed reasoning about a larger number of exceptional scenarios compared to
its formalization as a flat activity. We introduced sub-activities c subact 1(C,F,W ) – “C
consults the menu and communicates an order for food F to W ,” and c subact 2(C,W ) –
“C asksW for the bill and pays for it.” We encoded awaiter’s activities via objects of the
form w act(W,C, F1, F2) – “waiter W understood that customer C ordered food F1 and
served food F2 to him.” To allow reasoning about different types of exceptions including
miscommunication, F1 may be different from F2 and/or the food actually ordered by C.
We named the cook’s activities ck act(Ck, F,W ) – “cook Ck prepares food F for waiter
W .” Food F may not be the one ordered by the customer nor the one requested by W .
We encoded activities in Table 2 via ASP rules like:
activity(c act(C,R,W,F ))← customer(C), restaurant(R), waiter(W ), food(F ).
comp(c act(C,R,W,F ), 1, go(C,R)) ← activity(c act(C,R,W,F )).
. . .
comp(c act(C,R,W,F ), 9, leave(C)) ← activity(c act(C,R,W,F )).
length(c act(C,R,W,F ), 9) ← activity(c act(C,R,W,F )).
goal(c act(C,R,W,F ), satiated and out(C))← activity(c act(C,R,W,F )).
and specified the actor of each activity using the predicate actor(m,p).
Default Information about Restaurant Scenarios. In relation to characters’ ac-
tivities, we also define some default facts that complement the information that can
be extracted from a narrative. These state that, in any restaurant scenario, the cus-
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tomer initially (i.e., at time step 0 on the reasoning time line) selects the goal of being
satiated and out. Similarly, the waiter selects its goal served and billed(C) as soon as
customer C arrives, and the cook selects its goal done with request(Ck,W ) immediately
after receiving a food request from waiter W . This is encoded as follows:
occurs(select(C, satiated and out(C)), 0) ← customer(C).
occurs(select(W, served and billed(C)), I + 1)← waiter(W ),
holds(arrived(C,R), I + 1), ¬holds(arrived(C,R), I).
occurs(select(Ck, done with request(Ck,W )), I + 1)← cook(Ck),
holds(informed(Ck, F,W ), I + 1), ¬holds(informed(Ck, F,W ), I).
Once a goal is selected, the program assumes that each character starts one of their
candidate activities that can achieve this goal. The assumption is formalized by:
1{occurs(start(P,M), I + 1) : actor(M,P ), goal(M,G)}1← occurs(select(P,G), I).
4.3 Reasoning Module
We now concentrate on the reasoning module of the AIA architecture associated with
T I, and determine what parts of it can be imported/ adapted and what new rules need
to be added in order to capture the reasoning process of a reader of a narrative. In what
follows, we denote the reader’s reasoning module by RM and start with a few key points
in its AIA-inspired construction:
• A reader needs to map observations about fluents and actions (i.e., a history) into the
predicates holds and occurs used for reasoning. It also needs to perform diagnosis (just
like an intentional agent would) when reading pieces of information that are unexpected,
such as a waiter bringing the wrong dish. Thus the temporal projection and diagnostic
modules of AIA are imported into RM .
• The reader needs to fill the story time line with new time points (and thus construct
what we call a reasoning time line) to accommodate mental and physical actions not
mentioned in the text. This is achieved by adding new rules to RM , in which we de-
note story vs. reasoning time steps by predicates story step and step, respectively, and
introduce predicate map(s, i) to say that story step s is mapped into reasoning step i:
1{map(S, I) : step(I)}1 ← story step(S).
¬map(S, I) ← map(S1, I1), S < S1, I ≥ I1, story step(S), step(I).
Information about story steps that need to be mapped into consecutive reasoning time
steps, extracted from the input in the form of next st(s, s1) facts, is encoded by the rule:
map(S1, I + 1) ← next st(S, S1), map(S, I).
Observations about the occurrence of actions and values of fluents recorded from the
text using predicates st hpd and st obs as described in Subsection 4.4 are translated into
observations on the reasoning time line via the rules:
hpd(A, V, I) ← st hpd(A, V, S), map(S, I).
obs(F, V, I) ← st obs(F, V, S), map(S, I).
Finally, we do not want to create time steps on the reasoning time line when no action
is believed to have occurred (i.e., gaps). We encode this using the rules
smtg occurs(I) ← occurs(A, I).
← last assigned(I), step(J), J < I, not smtg occurs(J).
where last assigned(i) is true if i is the last time step on the reasoning time line that
has a correspondent on the story time line:
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¬last assigned(I)← map(S, J), step(I), step(J), I < J.
last assigned(I)← map(S, I), not ¬last assigned(I).
• A reader may be asked questions about the story. We support yes/no, when, who,
and where questions related to events. A question is represented by an atom question(q),
where q is a term encoding the question, e.g., occur(A) (“did action A occur?”), when(A)
(“when did A occur?”). Answers are encoded by atoms answer(q, a), where a is the an-
swer. For example, answer(occur(pay(nicole, b)), yes) states that the answer to question
“Did Nicole pay the bill?” is yes. Rules are used for identifying and returning the answers.
Due to space limitations, we only briefly illustrate the rules for question(occur(A)). Sup-
pose we want to reason about the occurrence of a specific event in a story. In that case, a
positive answer is returned if the reader has definite reasons for believing that the event
happened. This is encoded by the rule:
answer(occur(A), yes) ← question(occur(A)), physical action(A), step(I),
occurs(A, I).
Answering a definite “no” is less straightforward, as it requires ensuring that the action
did not happen at any step:
maybe(A)← physical action(A), step(I), not ¬occurs(A, I).
answer(occur(A), no)← question(occur(A)), physical action(A), step(I),
not answer(occur(A), yes), not maybe(A).
The first rule states that A may have occurred if, for some step I, there is lack of evidence
that I did not occur. The second rule yields answer “no” if there is no evidence that the
action definitely occurred and no reason to believe that the action may have occurred.
Blount et al. considered four categories of histories and described the encoding of the
corresponding agent strategies in AIA. We now analyze each category separately and
discuss its suitability for RM , as well as pertinent changes:
1. No goal nor activity to commit to. In AIA, the agent waits. In stereotypical
activities, agents have active pre-defined goals/ activities, so this is not relevant to RM .
2. A top-level activity is active but its goal is not. In AIA, the agent stops the
activity. Serendipitous achievement of a character’s goal by someone else’s actions can
happen in narratives about stereotypical activities (see Example 2). Thus AIA histories
of category 2 are relevant and the corresponding rules from AIA are included in RM .
3. A top-level activity and its goal are active. In AIA, the agent performs the
next action, unless there are no chances for the activity to still achieve its goal (i.e., the
activity is deemed futile), in which case it is stopped. RM imports the corresponding rules
for the agent strategy, but changes the definition of a futile activity, since RM captures
the reasoning of an external observer, not that of the agent involved in the activity. We
add default background knowledge about situations that render an activity futile to the
module describing activities and sequences (see Subsection 4.2). For example, we encode
the information that an activity of type c act(c, r,w, f) is futile if r is observed to be
closed when c wants to enter; if f is observed to be unavailable at r; etc., via rules like:
futile(c act(C,R,W,F ), I) ← obs(open(R), false, I), activity(c act(C,R,W,F )).
futile(c act(C,R,W,F ), I) ← obs(available(F,R), false, I),
activity(c act(C,R,W,F )).
More complex rules can also be added, such as that this activity is futile if no table is
available and the customer is impatient.
4. A goal is active but there is no active activity to achieve it. The agent
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needs to find a plan (i.e., start a new activity). Our cautious reader is not expected to
guess or assume the new plan that a character computes or selects, but rather determine
that re-planning is required. We introduce a new mental action replan(g) where g is a
goal, and add the following rule to RM :
occurs(replan(Ag,G), I) ← categ 4 hist(G, I), not impossible(replan(Ag,G), I),
not futile(Ag,G, I).
The complete set of RM rules for reasoning about activities and categories of histories
is shown in Figure 2.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
categ 2 hist(Ag,M, I) ← ¬holds(minor(Ag,M), I), holds(active(Ag,M), I),
goal(M,G), ¬holds(active goal(Ag,G), I).
categ 3 hist(Ag,M, I) ← ¬holds(minor(Ag,M), I), holds(in progress(Ag,M), I).
categ 4 hist(Ag,G, I) ← ¬holds(minor(Ag,G), I), holds(active goal(Ag,G), I),
¬holds(in progress(Ag,G), I).
occurs(stop(Ag,M), I) ← categ 2 hist(Ag,M, I).
occurs(AA, I) ← categ 3 hist(Ag,M, I), not futile(Ag,M, I),
¬holds(minor(Ag,M), I), holds(in progress(Ag,M), I),
holds(next action(Ag,M,AA), I), not impossible(AA,I).
occurs(stop(Ag,M), I) ← categ 3 hist(Ag,M, I), futile(Ag,M, I), activity(M).
mental inertial fluent(replanned(Ag,G)) ← agent(Ag), possible goal(Ag,G).
holds(replanned(Ag,G), I + 1) ← occurs(replan(Ag,G), I).
impossible(replan(Ag,G), I) ← holds(replanned(Ag,G), I).
impossible(replan(Ag,G), I) ← occurs(start(Ag,M), I), possible goal(Ag,G).
occurs(replan(Ag,G), I) ← categ 4 hist(Ag,G, I), not impossible(replan(Ag,G), I),
not futile(Ag,G, I).
occurs(wait(Ag), I) ← categ 4 hist(Ag,G, I), futile(Ag,G, I).
justified(Ag,A, I) ← holds(next action(Ag,M,A), I), physical agent action(Ag,A).
← occurs(A, I),not justified(Ag,A, I), physical agent action(Ag,A).
Fig. 2. RM rules for reasoning about activities and histories.
This concludes the description of the main parts of RM and that of the pre-defined
parts in the logic program constructed according to our methodology.
4.4 Logic Form
Now, we describe the input-dependent part of the logic program that is constructed
for every narrative. The text is translated into a logic form that contains two parts:
(a) definitions of instances of relevant sorts, e.g. customer , waiter , food , restaurant ;
and (b) observations about the values of fluents and occurrence of actions in relation
to the story time line. While this may be accomplished in various ways, currently we
adopt an approach that comes from a combination of techniques introduced by Lierler
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r1,r2, e1
entity(r1), entity(r2), property(r1, nicole), property(r2,“vegetarian restaurant′′)
event(e1), eventType(e1, go 01), eventArgs(e1, a1, r1), eventArgs(e1, a4, r2)
Fig. 3. DRS for the sample sentence
et al. (2017) and Balduccini et al. (2007). In the former, the text is translated into a
Discourse Representation Structure (DRS) (Kamp and Reyle 1993) by integrating the
outputs of the lth semantic role labeler and of coreNLP. While the DRS is a logical
representation, it is still largely focused on linguistic elements rather than on concepts
relevant to an action theory. Balduccini et al. (2007) bridged this gap by means of special
ASP rules that carry out a final mapping step into an Object Semantic Representation
(OSR) featuring the elements listed earlier in this paragraph.
As an example, let us illustrate how the sentence “Nicole went to a vegetarian restau-
rant” is translated to our target logic form. Following Lierler et al.’s approach (2017),
lth is used to identify entities and verbs and to label entities by the roles they play in
the verbs as identified by the PropBank3 frame schemas. This results in
[V (go.01) went] [A1 Nicole] [A4 “to a vegetarian restaurant”]
where go.01 denotes sense 1 of verb go from the Ontonotes Sense Groupings, A1 is the
verb’s entity in motion, and A4 is its end point. Next, coreNLP carries out mention
detection and coreference resolution, grouping the phrases from the output of lth that
denote the same object. Then, a postprocessing step occurs, which assigns unique labels
to the the entities of the DRS, yielding the first two rows of the DRS from Figure 3.
This step also leverages the PropBank frame schemas to generate the description of
the events of the DRS found in the third row of Figure 3. Finally, the postprocessing
step assigns time steps to the verbs according to their syntactic ordering in the passage,
resulting in the final row of the Figure. OSR rules from (Balduccini et al. 2007) are then
used to generate the final representation of the story. While at this stage the OSR rules
are created manually, it is conceivable that they can be automatically generated from
the PropBank frame schemas. A sample rule that maps verb go.01 to the occurrence
of an action is:
st hpd(go(Actor,Dest), true, S)←
event(Ev), eventT ype(Ev, go 01),
eventArgs(Ev, a1, EActor), property(EActor, Actor),
eventArgs(Ev, a4, EDest), property(EDest,Dest).
The ORS rules can also introduce new constants (e.g., cook1) when the name of one of the
entities is not given in the text. Note that, in order to distinguish between the story time
line and the reasoning time line, we substitute the predicates obs(f ,v, i) and hpd(a,v, i)
normally used in the description of histories (Blount et al. 2015) by st obs(f ,v, s) (fluent
f from the KB has value v at time step s in the story time line, where v may be true
or false) and st hpd(a,v, s) (action a from the KB was observed to have occurred if v
3 The PropBank project (Palmer et al. 2005) provides a corpus of text annotated with information
about basic semantic propositions.
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is true, or not if v is false, at time step s in the story time line). In addition to the
observations obtained directly from the text (mentioned there explicitly), the logic form
also contains default, commonsensical observations such as the fact that the restaurant
is assumed to be open, the customer is hungry, the waiter is at the entrance, and so on.
Example 5 (Logic Form for a Text)
The text in Example 1 is thus translated into a logic form that includes the following
facts in addition to the default observations:
customer(nicole).
restaurant(veg r).
food(lentil soup).
waitress(waitress).
cook(cook1).
st hpd(go(nicole, veg r), true, 0).
st hpd(order(nicole, lentil soup, waitress), true, 1).
st hpd(put down(waitress, lentil soup, t), true, 2).
st hpd(eat(nicole, lentil soup), true, 3).
st hpd(leave(nicole), true, 4).
Questions are translated, in a similar way, to a logic form consisting of atoms of the
form question(q), discussed earlier. For instance, questions q1 and q2 below are linked to
actions leave(nicole) and pay(nicole, b) from the KB, resp., yielding the logic forms:
Did Nicole leave the restaurant? Logic form: question(occur(leave(nicole))) (q1)
Did Nicole pay for the soup? Logic form: question(occur(pay(nicole, b))) (q2)
5 Methodology Application
We applied our methodology to a collection of stories describing normal scenarios and
different types of exceptional scenarios. In this section, we exemplify our outcomes on a
few illustrative stories. We test understanding via questions about the occurrence of an
event, which may not be explicitly mentioned in the text. Such questions are problematic
for systems based on statistical methods. Given that we use a logic approach, based on
ASP and its extensions, the correctness of the answers provided by our methodology
can be proven for certain classes of text-question pairs via methods similar to those
employed by Todorova and Gelfond (2012). In the future, we plan to perform a more
formal evaluation on a larger corpus, possibly based on recent story benchmarks (e.g.,
(Richardson et al. 2013; Mostafazadeh et al. 2016)). Mueller’s corpora are proprietary
and thus not available.
5.1 Normal Scenario in Example 1
The answer set of the program Π(1) obtained according to our methodology contains
the occurs(a, i) atoms shown in Appendix A, where a is an action and i is a time point
on the reasoning time line. We use this case as a baseline when explaining the output
of exceptional scenarios. As expected, the customer’s actions are interleaved with those
of the waitress and cook. As well, an agent’s mental actions (i.e., selecting a goal and
starting/ stopping an activity) take one time step when no other action of the same agent
occur.
5.2 Serendipitous Achievement of Goal in Example 2
The logic form for this scenario is identical to the one for Example 1 shown in Example 5,
except that the three observations about actions taking place at story time points 2–4
are replaced by
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st hpd(pay(owner, b), true, 2). st hpd(put down(waitress, lentil soup, t), true, 3).
st hpd(eat(nicole, lentil soup), true, 4). st hpd(leave(nicole), true, 5).
where owner is a new instance of sort person . Program Π(2) has several answer sets, each
one mapping the occurrence of action pay(owner, b) into a different reasoning time step
from 12 to 18. Each of these answer sets also contains similar occurs atoms to Π(1) up
to time step 20 when Nicole eats the soup and the waitress stops her activity (given that
the bill is already paid). From then on, it contains the following occurs predicates:
occurs(stop(waitress, w act(waitress, nicole, lentil soup, lentil soup)), 20)
occurs(eat(nicole, lentil soup), 20) occurs(stand up(nicole), 23)
occurs(start(nicole, c subact 2(nicole)), 21) occurs(move(nicole, t, entrance), 24)
occurs(stop(nicole, c subact 2(nicole)), 22) occurs(leave(nicole), 25)
occurs(stop(nicole, c act(nicole, veg r, lentil soup)), 26)
Thus, our system understands that Nicole has stopped c subact 2 immediately after start-
ing it because she realized that its goal is already fulfilled. Note that approaches that do
not view characters as goal-driven agents (including (Gabaldon 2009; Ng and Mooney 1992;
Mueller 2007)) face substantial difficulties or simply cannot handle serendipitous scenar-
ios. All answer sets of program Π(2) ∪ {q1, q2} contain the additional atoms
answer(occur(leave(nicole)), yes) answer(occur(pay(nicole, b)), no)
specifying that the answer to question q1 is Yes, while the answer to q2 is No.
5.3 Futile Activity in Example 3
The logic form for Example 3 contains the following observations:
st hpd(go(nicole, veg r), true, 0). st hpd(sit(nicole), true, 1).
st hpd(pick up(nicole, m, t), true, 2). st obs(available(lentil soup, veg r), false, 3).
and a fact next st(2, 3) stating that story time steps 2 and 3 should be translated into
consecutive reasoning time steps (see Section 4.3).
ProgramΠ(3) has multiple answer sets varying in the explanation for st obs: exogenous
actionmake unavailable(lentil soup, veg r) occurs at a different reasoning time points
in each of them. Otherwise, these answer sets contain the same occurs predicates as Π(1)
until step 9; then Nicole stops her futile activity and replans for her still active goal:
occurs(stop(nicole, c act(nicole, veg r, waitress, lentil soup)), 10)
occurs(replan(nicole, satiated and out(nicole)), 11)
Thus the reader is cautious and does not make any assumptions about Nicole leaving the
restaurant. As expected, it does not state that Nicole ate lentil soup either, which would
be impossible, nor that she paid for anything.
5.4 Diagnosis in Example 4
The logic form for Example 4 contains a new instance of sort food , miso soup, and the
observations:
st hpd(go(nicole, veg r), true, 0).
st hpd(order(nicole, lentil soup, waitress), true, 1).
st hpd(put down(waitress, miso soup, t), true, 2).
The program Π(4) has two answer sets, containing explanations on what went wrong.
Answer Set 1. The first answer set indicates that the waitress started a different activity
at time step 4 than the one in the normal scenario in Example 1:
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occurs(start(waitress, w act(waitress, nicole, miso soup, miso soup)), 4)
This activity can be read as “the waitress understood that Nicole ordered a miso soup
and served her a miso soup.” Recall that a waiter’s possible activities are of the form
w act(W,C, F1, F2), where F1 may be a different food than the one actually ordered
by the customer C, which allows reasoning about miscommunication between customer
and waiter as in this answer set. Also, F2 may be a different food than F1, meaning
that the food served may not be the one that the waiter recorded as being ordered by
the customer, which we will see in the second answer set. Our program considers all
possible activities that can satisfy an agent’s goal and decides that the activity that can
explain the later enfolding of the scenario must be the activity that the agent is actually
executing.
This first answer set contains the same occurs predicates as Π(1) up to time step 10,
and then:
occurs(interference, 11)
occurs(order(nicole, lentil soup, waitress), 11)
occurs(move(waitress, t, kt), 12)
occurs(stop(nicole, c subact 1(nicole, lentil soup)), 12)
occurs(request(waitress,miso soup, cook1), 13)
occurs(select(cook1, done with request(cook1, waitress)), 14)
occurs(start(cook1, ck act(cook1, miso soup, waitress)), 15)
occurs(prepare(cook1,miso soup, waitress), 16)
occurs(stop(cook1, ck act(cook1, miso soup, waitress)), 17)
occurs(pick up(waitress,miso soup, kt), 17)
occurs(move(waitress, kt, t), 18)
occurs(put down(waitress,miso soup, t), 19)
Here, the reader’s explanation is that there was some interference at time step 11 when
Nicole ordered the lentil soup. As a result, the waitress misunderstood the order to be
for miso soup and the cook followed her request.
Answer Set 2. The second answer set differs from the first in terms of what occurs at
time steps 11-13, in particular
occurs(interference, 13)
occurs(request(waitress, lentil soup, cook1), 13)
and the activities started by the waiter and cook at time steps 4 and 15:
occurs(start(waitress, w act(waitress, nicole, lentil soup,miso soup)), 4)
occurs(start(cook1, ck act(cook1,miso soup, waitress)), 15)
It corresponds to a second possible explanation in which the waitress understood the
order correctly and the misunderstanding/ interference occurred at step 13 when she
communicated the order to the cook. (Note that the reader makes no assumptions about
what happens next.)
Question Answering. These two answer sets show how reasoning by cases in ASP is useful
to answering questions like: Did the waitress ask the cook to prepare a lentil soup? whose
answer would be No in the first case (answer set 1) and Yes in the second one (answer
set 2). In the future, we envision answering questions like Why did Nicole receive a wrong
order? by producing the answers A1: Because the waitress misunderstood the order./ A2:
Because the cook misunderstood the order.
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5.5 Discussion
While we exemplified and tested our methodology on restaurant scenarios, our approach
is equally applicable to other stereotypical activities, if we maintain the assumption
that the knowledge base contains the relevant commonsense information. The main
task when addressing a new stereotypical activity is defining the different T I activi-
ties, including goals, of each involved agent. Part of this process can be automated by
starting from a rigid and centralized script learned in an unsupervised manner (e.g.,
(Regneri et al. 2010)) and then assigning its actions to the activities of different agents,
those performing them. Determining (sub-)goals and splitting activities into sub-activities
is a more challenging problem, which deserves substantial attention.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work, we proposed a new methodology for automating the understanding of narra-
tives about stereotypical activities. As a first main contribution, we overcame limitations
of Mueller’s work (2007) related to exceptional scenarios. To achieve this, we had to
abandon Mueller’s rigid script-based approach and use instead a substantial portion of a
state-of-the-art intelligent agent architecture, augmented with support for intentions.
Our second contribution is extending the architecture of an intentional agent, AIA
(Blount et al. 2015), to model a third-person observer. We exemplified our methodol-
ogy on several types of scenarios. In the future, we intend to create an extensive story
corpus, which will be a laborious task, to further test our methodology.
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Appendix A Partial Output for the Normal Scenario in Example 1
map(0, 2)
map(1, 11)
map(2, 19)
map(3, 20)
map(4, 31)
occurs(select(nicole, satiated and out(nicole)), 0)
occurs(start(nicole, c act(nicole, veg r, waitress, lentil soup)), 1)
occurs(go(nicole, veg r), 2)
occurs(select(waitress, served and billed(nicole)), 3)
occurs(start(waitress, w act(waitress, nicole, lentil soup, lentil soup)), 4)
occurs(greet(waitress, nicole), 5)
occurs(lead to(waitress, nicole, t), 6)
occurs(sit(nicole), 7)
occurs(start(nicole), c subact 1(nicole, lentil soup, waitress)), 8)
occurs(pick up(nicole, m, t), 9)
occurs(put down(nicole, m, t), 10)
occurs(order(nicole, lentil soup, waitress), 11)
occurs(stop(nicole, c subact 1(nicole, lentil soup, waitress)), 12)
occurs(move(waitress, t, kt), 12)
occurs(request(waitress, lentil soup, cook1), 13)
occurs(select(cook1, done with request(cook1, waitress)), 14)
occurs(start(cook1, ck act(cook1, lentil soup, waitress)), 15)
occurs(prepare(cook1, lentil soup, waitress), 16)
occurs(stop(cook1, ck act(cook1, lentil soup, waitress)), 17)
occurs(pick up(waitress, lentil soup, kt), 17)
occurs(move(waitress, kt, t), 18)
occurs(put down(waitress, lentil soup, t), 19)
occurs(eat(nicole, lentil soup), 20)
occurs(start(nicole, c subact 2(nicole, waitress)), 21)
occurs(request(nicole, b, waitress), 22)
occurs(move(waitress, t, ct), 23)
occurs(pick up(waitress, b, ct), 24)
occurs(move(waitress, ct, t), 25)
occurs(put down(waitress, b, t), 26)
occurs(stop(waitress, w act(waitress, nicole, lentil soup, lentil soup)), 27)
occurs(pay(nicole, b), 27)
occurs(stop(nicole, c subact 2(nicole, waitress)), 28)
occurs(stand up(nicole), 29)
occurs(move(nicole, t, entrance), 30)
occurs(leave(nicole), 31)
occurs(stop(nicole, c act(nicole, veg r, waitress, lentil soup)), 32)
